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A South African Perspective on Social and Economic Rights
by R i c h a rd J . Go l d s t o n e

A

mental level because many judicial decisions involve some determination of the allocation of public funds.

as to whether a country’s constitution should make provisions for social and economic
rights is a political one, the task of interpreting and
enforcing such rights is undoubtedly judicial in nature.
When interpreting and enforcing these rights, judges often face the
unenviable task of weighing the critical needs of individual citizens
against the legitimate budgetary constraints of the state. Despite the
view of certain individuals that this sort of task is either undesirable
or impossible, this article demonstrates how South Africa’s
Constitutional Court has successfully enforced the constitution’s provisions for social and economic rights while balancing the state’s
interest in managing its political affairs. Although this balancing
approach is not always easy, the South African experience has been
largely successful. As such, an analysis of the Constitutional Court’s
jurisprudence on this issue is suggestive of how other countries such
as the United States might (re)consider their courts’ approach to the
question of social and economic rights.
LTHOUGH THE DECISION

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS
IN SOUTH AFRICA
IN SOUTH AFRICA THE CONSTITUTION’S DRAFTERS believed that
the overwhelming majority of South Africans, in particular the previously oppressed black South Africans, would not be particularly concerned with so-called “first-generation” rights, such as freedom of
speech, assembly, association, and movement. All of these first generation rights were thought not to be of great concern to individuals
who did not have enough food to eat, or a roof above their heads, or
money to send their children to school. Rather, it was felt that for
South Africa’s new constitution in 1994 and its final constitution in
1996 to be relevant to the majority of South Africans, it would have
to include “third-generation” rights, such as rights to housing, health
care, and education.

THE FALSE DISTINCTION BETWEEN POSITIVE AND
NEGATIVE RIGHTS
LET ME FIRST REFER TO WHAT I WOULD SUGGEST is the false dis-

“The question thus becomes
whether courts should
become involved in instructing
the legislature or executive
how to allocate such funds.
Many individuals believe that it
is not the province of the
judiciary to do so.”

tinction between positive and negative rights that one often reads, for
example, in the decisions of some American judges. They argue that
negative rights, which protect individuals from interference, can be
enforced, but positive rights, such as social and economic rights,
encroach on the powers of the legislative and executive branches. In
the view of many American courts, because these rights involve
enabling individuals through the allocation of public funds, they cannot be enforced.1 The question thus becomes whether courts
should become involved in instructing the legislature or executive
how to allocate such funds. Many individuals believe that it is not
the province of the judiciary to do so.
What these proponents of positive and negative rights fail
to realize, however, is that most court decisions involve spending public money. Take, for instance, judicial decisions ordering
the improvement of prison conditions. Such decisions may be
based on the premise of protecting the negative rights of incarcerated individuals; however, they also entail a positive obligation because they compel government action that is likely to cost
hundreds of millions of dollars. In California, for example, a
federal judge issued an order threatening to take over
California’s prisons if the state did not take bolder steps to
ensure prison reform.2 Sufficient steps were not taken and the
whole state prison system is now under federal court control.
Similarly, the mandated bussing that followed Brown v. Board of
Education is an example of judicial enforcement that has cost
taxpayers huge amounts of money.3 Ultimately, this dichotomy
between positive and negative rights breaks down at a funda-

The South African Constitution very carefully delineates
social and economic rights, and provides that “everyone”4 is entitled to reasonable access to housing, health care, and education.5
The Constitutional Court has held, however, that “reasonable
access” does not mean that an individual is entitled to these provisions. Rather, these provisions should be progressively provided,
taking into account the financial ability of the state. Indeed, the
Constitution is carefully worded to give appropriate deference to
the legislature, and it can be very difficult for courts and judges in
the context of that careful wording to determine at what point the
legislature or executive can be faulted and told that it is acting
unconstitutionally.

Richard J. Goldstone recently retired as a justice of the South African Constitutional
Court. From 1994 to 1996, he was Chief Prosecutor for the United Nations Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
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it could only interfere in situations where there was an unconstitutional violation of equality; for example, if the priority list prepared
by the doctors gave preference to individuals of a particular race.
Unfortunately, national television stations took their cameras to
Soobramoney’s home the day the opinion came down rejecting the
claim for dialysis treatment. He was sitting with his wife and three
children, and they asked him how he felt about the decision to
deny him dialysis treatment. Before he could even begin to answer,
however, he had a stroke and died within the hour. The Court was
criticized by much of the media for effectively sentencing
Soobramoney to death.
Perhaps the most dramatic case in the Constitutional Court’s
history thus far has been Minister of Health v. Treatment Action
Campaign.8 This particular case involved the supply of a drug called
Nevirapine to pregnant mothers. The drug has been very successful
in stopping the transmission of the HIV virus from HIV-positive
mothers to their newborn children. It is inexpensive and easily dispensed; the mother has to have one small dose during labor and the
child a very small dose at birth. But the South African government
has an ambivalent and in some ways irrational approach to
HIV/AIDS. Some senior ministers, and even President Thabo
Mbeki at one stage, have denied that the HIV virus is the cause of
AIDS. As such, only two test stations in two medical facilities were
set up within the country, effectively denying Nevirapine to 90 percent of South Africa’s pregnant mothers.
Because the government could not challenge the undeniable
efficacy of the drug, it argued that too many obstacles prevented it
from safely and effectively administering the drug. First, the government argued that the drug had potential side effects. There was
no evidence of these side effects, however, and the World Health
Organization has authorized the drug’s use. The government also
said that there were insufficient nursing aids to explain how to use
the drug and its potential side effects. In response, the Court insisted on obtaining evidence for these claims, and proposed that nursing aids be trained to provide adequate guidance to expectant
mothers.
The government argued that the use of Nevirapine would
require mothers to understand that they could not breast-feed to
prevent the transfer of the HIV virus to their children. The government contended that there was no use in taking a drug and possibly building up resistance to it if a mother was then going to
breast-feed her child. The Court responded, however, that individuals could be trained to educate expectant mothers about these
risks. Finally, the government objected on the grounds that women
who did not breast-feed would need clean water for formula,
which was not available in some areas. The Court held that this
was not a reason to deny the drug, but rather a reason to supply
clean water. If no clean water were available, the mother would not
be advised to take the drug.
As a result, the government was ordered to supply the drug to
every hospital in South Africa. In its decision, the Court relied not
only on the right to medical treatment but also equality:
Nevirapine could not be supplied to some mothers and not others.
The government, to its great credit in this and other cases where
the Court has ruled against it, has quickly implemented the orders
of the Constitutional Court.

SOUTH AFRICA’S RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE

Courtesy of the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law

The first case the South African Constitutional Court heard
on social and economic rights was the worst possible beginning. In
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, an Indian South African living
in the city of Durban had an ischemic heart, a failed liver, and a
life expectation of approximately 18 months.6 Soobramoney’s condition required that he receive treatment at least once a week. He
went to a public government hospital for dialysis, but was denied
treatment because the hospital only had provisions for 78 patients
in any given week. Therefore, the hospital gave priority to patients
who were in line to receive transplants, who needed only shortterm treatment, and who would make a full recovery. In other
words, to give Soobramoney dialysis would have prevented a different patient from receiving the long-term benefits of treatment.
When hospital authorities reluctantly explained to him that the
treatment was not available, Soobramoney brought an urgent
application to the High Court at Durban, which ordered the government to provide him with the dialysis. The government urgently appealed, and the Constitutional Court heard the appeal.

Richard J. Wilson, Richard J. Goldstone, Hadar Harris, and
Herman Schwartz.

The Constitutional Court held that it could not order the
dialysis treatment. First, the Court rejected Soobramoney’s argument that this was emergency treatment, which is an absolute right
under the South African Constitution and not, like other forms of
health care, something to which the government must only provide reasonable access.7 The Court said emergency treatment is the
sort of treatment that an individual receives in trauma and emergency wards following a serious accident. Soobramoney’s situation,
as grave as it was, did not require such a level of care. Second, the
Court unanimously held that it could not order the hospital to
purchase more dialysis machines. The budget had been carefully
drafted in the state hospitals, and more machines would have
meant less money for medicines, which would have altered the
hospital’s budgetary determinations. In the judges’ conference
room, it was noted that ordering more dialysis machines would
open the door to situations where individuals could demand nonemergency treatments that would cost hospitals significant
amounts of money.
The Court held that it could not interfere and tell the government how to stock its medical supplies. Rather, the Court said that
5
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what would be a minimum core for health care. Instead it reiterated that although there must be adequate provisions for the
country’s neediest, such determinations were not the business of
the judiciary. The Court recommended that the government
address these problems and requested that the Human Rights
Commission, which was established by the Constitution, monitor
the government and, if necessary, come back to the Court if it was
of the view that the government was not taking the decision seriously. To date, the Human Rights Commission has not returned
to the Court.
Another interesting case in South Africa’s rights jurisprudence
that is often overlooked is Minister of Public Works v. Kyalami
Ridge.10 Kyalami cropped up about six months after the Grootboom
decision and involved a group of poor squatter-dwellers who were
living outside Johannesburg in Alexandra Township, which is located on the banks of a stream. One day, the stream flooded and
washed away the squatter-dwellers’ homes. In light of the
Grootboom decision, the government allocated 300 million rand for
those affected by the flood and established a cabinet committee to
determine what to do with these homeless squatter-dwellers. The
committee decided to give them temporary prefabricated homes
with bathroom facilities on the grounds of a large farm prison outside of Johannesburg, near Kyalami Ridge, an upper-middle class
white residential suburb. Property owners of Kyalami Ridge argued
that placing these squatter-dwellers half a mile from the suburb
would depress their property values. They said the legislature did
not have a right to take this action and that the Constitution should
not be converted into legislation. A High Court judge ordered that
the government immediately stop building these prefabricated
houses. The Constitutional Court, however, heard an urgent appeal
and reversed the decision. The Court held that the government had
acted properly in providing housing to the squatter-dwellers. It concluded that where there is a constitutional demand, no special legislation is necessary because the demand itself is sufficient legislative
authority to authorize government action.
The most recent case handed down in the last couple of
months was President of the Republic of South Africa v. Modderklip,
which concerned farmland in the same province as Johannesburg.11
A farmer had a fairly large plot of land that approximately 10,000
squatter-dwellers had unlawfully inhabited over the years. The
farmer received an order from the High Court authorizing the
squatter-dwellers’ eviction, but when he went to implement the
order the sheriff noted that it would cost 1.8 million rand to execute. The farmer refused to pay the fee and argued that it exceeded

A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HOUSING
In addition to the right to health care, the Constitutional
Court has also pushed the South African government to ensure the
rights of its citizens in cases concerning the right to housing. In
Government of the RSA v. Grootboom, hundreds of squatter-dwellers
who lived in an area on the banks of a river outside of Cape Town
lost their homes during a flood.9 The squatter-dwellers moved
onto private property and built makeshift homes with cardboard
and plastic that provided minimal protection from the elements.
Shamefully, the owner of this private property was encouraged by
local authorities to apply for their eviction, which the lower court
granted. In response, the squatter-dwellers brought an application
against Cape Town’s provisional government and the city government, which asserted that the South African Constitution provided a right to housing.
The government argued that its housing scheme, which provided housing for over three million families, as well as electricity
and water for millions of South Africans, was evidence that it had

“By questioning unjust
resource distributions and
affirming the right to social and
economic benefits, [the South
African Constitution] is
facilitating the transformation
of an apartheid society into a
democratic society.”
taken the social and economic rights provisions of the
Constitution seriously. In a unanimous decision, the 11 members
of the Constitutional Court praised the government housing policy and its significant achievements. The Court noted, however,
that the policy did not provide for the poorest of the poor or for
emergency situations. It said that where reasonable access to housing had been provided as a constitutional requirement, there had
to be minimal provisions for emergencies and for individuals of
lower socio-economic status. The government’s response was that
these provisions would drain its resources.
Notably, the Court was urged in an amicus curiae brief to
adopt the “minimum core” approach of the United Nations
Committee on Social and Economic Rights that has been developed over decades, and that identifies minimum core social and
economic rights. The Court refused to implement this approach,
however, because there was insufficient information to determine
what constitutes a minimum core for housing or, by extension,

These articles by Aryeh Neier and Richard J.
Goldstone are part of the Center for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law’s year-long

focus on “Perspectives on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights.” To hear a podcast of
all events in the series, please visit

www.wcl.american.edu/humright/center.
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the land’s market value. Instead, he started a new case in the
Pretoria High Court, which ordered the government to expropriate
the land and maintain it permanently for these squatter-dwellers.
The government appealed the case to the Constitutional
Court and argued that private individuals had infringed
Modderklip’s property rights. It also argued that Modderklip was
not entitled to the relief he claimed because he had failed to submit a timely application for the eviction order. The Court found
that it was unreasonable for the government to do nothing when it
was impossible for Modderklip to evict the large number of squatter-dwellers. The Court ordered the government to pay damages,
to pay the farm owner the value of his property, and to expropriate the land if they wished. These remedies compensated
Modderklip for the unlawful occupation of his property in violation of his rights while ensuring that the squatter-dwellers continued to have accommodation until suitable alternatives were found.
Without the housing provision of South Africa’s Constitution, the
Court could never have made such an order.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL

right to social and economic benefits, it is facilitating the transformation of an apartheid society into a democratic society. Indeed, as the
Modderklip case demonstrates, ownership is not necessarily a trump
card in the new South Africa. The government can override ownership
in the interests of securing social and economic rights for South
African citizens that are guaranteed by the new constitution.
South Africa does not have to be an isolated example. There
is also room in the United States to monitor the manner in which
social and economic rights are implemented. One important
example is the response by the federal and state governments in the
post-Hurricane Katrina Gulf states, particularly in New Orleans
and other parts of Louisiana. This tragedy demonstrates the false
distinction between positive and negative rights because the government inevitably will have to invest in the region and provide for
its citizens if the area is ever to be rebuilt successfully. As such,
there must be some duty on behalf of the government to spend the
billions of dollars it will have to use in an appropriate fashion and
in accordance with the principles of due process and equal protection. There must be rights to housing, health care, and education
that should be taken into account in some rational way. Creative
NGOs and imaginative academics should examine international
legal requirements in this regard to determine the extent to which,
HRB
if any, they might be applicable in the United States.

CONCLUSION
COURT has referred to the South African

Constitution on a number of occasions as a “transformation constitution.” By questioning unjust resource distributions and affirming the
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tion make reference to “citizens.” This definition, however, had to be limited
and could not refer to tourists or illegal immigrants.
5 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, ch. 2, §§ 26, 27, 29 (Oct. 11,
1996), available at http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/constitution/saconst.html?rebookmark=1 (accessed Feb. 6, 2006).
6 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health [KwaZulu-Natal], 1997 (12) BCLR 1696
(CC) (S. Afr.).
7 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa at §§ 27(1), 27(3).
8 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
9 Government of the RSA v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.). Grootboom in Afrikaans is a Dutch word that means big tree.
10 Minister of Public Works and Others v. Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Others, 2001 (7) BCLR 652 (CC) (S. Afr.).
11 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Modderklip Boerdery
(Pty) Ltd and Others, 2005 (—) BCLR — (CC) (S. Afr.).

1 Deshaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), held that nothing in
the Due Process Clause itself requires the state to protect life, liberty, or property of citizens against invasion by private actors.
2 Richard Gonzales, National Public Radio, “Judge Urges California Prison
Reform,” http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=3620517
(July 26, 2004).
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 Khosa and Others v. Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule and Another v.
Minister of Social Development and Others, 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (S. Afr.). In
Khosa, which dealt with social welfare grants to children and the elderly, the
government passed legislation limiting social welfare to South African citizens.
The Constitutional Court held that the use of “everyone” in the Constitution
refers to all lawful residents in the country, such as the many hundreds of
thousands of permanent residents lawfully living in the country. The government replied that it would cost hundreds of millions of rand more because of
the hundreds of thousands of elderly individuals and children of permanent
residents. The Constitutional Court said “everyone” must be given a unique
meaning, especially taking into account that other provisions of the Constitu-
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